


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**THE GULF WAR:  
U.A.E. PARTICIPATION IN THAT WAR**

BY

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## ABSTRACT

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This paper deals with the events leading up to the Gulf War and the War itself. It begins with a history of the Gulf region and the creation of the Gulf states after the British colonial period. The study discusses the history and the events leading up to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The International reaction is reviewed and also the impact of the embargo. The United Arab Emirates played an extremely important role in the events in the Gulf and from the conflict the Gulf states became closer. The United States role in the Gulf War has led to increased ties with the Gulf States and the relation is one with benefits for both.

## INTRODUCTION

### Historical Linkage

The geographical position of the Arabian Peninsula has had a significant impact on human history since Prophet Mohammed brought about one of the greatest revolutions in history. The introduction of Islam has influenced the entire Arabian Peninsula and spread its influence throughout the world. In the early Islamic era, Muslim believers carried the message of Islam to various parts of the world, seeking to spread the new religion and its noble teachings to other regions and among other peoples. Thanks to a talented and enthusiastic Arab leadership, the Islamic nation realized, within a short span of time, major military and intellectual successes in spite of the immense difficulties and obstacles. Perhaps Islam's greatest achievement was its success in establishing the unity of the Arabian Peninsula, an area that had been torn for many centuries by disunity, tribal conflicts and wars, all of which inevitably affected social, political and economic conditions in the region.

In less than 50 years, the unity of the whole Arabian Peninsula was achieved. This consolidation of territory was realized in record time, unprecedented in history. This unity was the key element in the forging of the Arab world in the post-Islamic era, and heralded the end of divisions, conflicts and backwardness. So it was also the start of a new age that witnessed the foundations of a rich Arab culture which gave light to the various communities and peoples who converted to the new

religion. Thus, Islam made a genuine contribution to the progress and prosperity of many people who were in contact with the emerging dynamic culture.

During the Middle Ages, the Arabian peninsula played a major role in human history and its cultural impact on other nations was far greater than the external influences affecting it. The emergence of Islam was accompanied by a wave of Arab migration from the heart of the Arabian Peninsula to the countries which were conquered by Muslim forces.

### Foreign Invasions

The history of the Arabian peninsula area is closely linked with that of Oman and the Arabian Gulf. It goes back many thousands of years. Research and excavations have revealed that stone age man once lived in this area. This area saw severe fighting between the invading Persians and Romans during the three centuries preceding the dawn of Islam. With the spread of Islam, the Muslims wiped out the occupying powers from the area. In the 18th century, the Portuguese entered the Arabian Gulf and destroyed the Arab fleet. However, the Arab offered severe resistance and continued fighting making great sacrifices in their attempts to overthrow the Portuguese.

Later, this area attracted countries like Britain, France, and Holland, who wanted to protect their trade routes to India and east. Finally, Britain was able to force the other powers out of the Gulf and succeed in establishing a secure presence in the area by 1820. This area came under British protection. During

that era, the area was underdeveloped. For example, there were no roads, no communication links with the outer world. Modern medical facilities were non-existent, nor were there any educational facilities established. Literate people in the region could be counted on a person's fingers. This remained little changed for almost 150 years, until 1968.

On 17 January 1968 the British announcement that it intended to withdraw all its forces from east of Suez and to end its military and political presence in the Gulf. This announcement meant that the Gulf would lose the power that had dominated the region since the 1820s. States that had never really had to rule themselves would suddenly become independent. It transformed the military rivalry among the major Gulf states from a relatively low-level contest to the Gulf-wide struggle for military and political dominance.

Britain had laid the groundwork for a continuing crisis in Southeast Arabia. It is scarcely surprising, therefore, that the British announcement that it would withdraw from all its remaining commitments in the Gulf precipitated a region-wide crisis. The announcement also left little time for the Gulf states to adjust to independence. The rulers of the Gulf received their first formal notification in January 1968. Iran reacted by attempting to seize control of several strategic islands in the Gulf near the Strait of Hormuz. When British withdrawal finally came to an end in 1971, it left the smaller southern Gulf states deeply divided. Although the former Trucial

emirates were linked together in the loose federation that became the United Arab Emirates, several members of the federation were involved in a serious internal power struggle.

Sheikh Zayed moved to take the lead in efforts to create a new political structure within the region that could fill the void once the British left the area. A month after Sheikh Zayed met at Sameeh on the coast between Abu-Dhabi and Dubai with Sheikh Rashid bin Said Al-Maktoum, an experienced ruler who had succeeded in a climate of economic adversity in bringing development to his emirate that outstripped that achieved by Abu-Dhabi, despite his lack of oil revenues. Together, Sheikh Zayed and Sheikh Rashid agreed that they would form a federation, and they invited the rulers of the other five Trucial States, Sharjah, Rasal-Khaimah Fujairah, Ajman and Umm al-Aaiwain.

This agreement was to form the basis for the federation of the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The idea of cooperation between the Trucial States was not new. A common history, language and culture had long formed a basis of unity between the rulers and people of the coastal and inland areas of the southeast Arabian peninsula. The ever changing pattern of alliances over previous centuries, sometimes friendly, and sometimes less so, had helped to create the sense of a common identity. Moreover, since the beginning of the 1950s, there had been regular meetings of all the rulers in a Trucial States Council. The U.A.E. managed to reach an agreement for federation in July 1971, with independence only a few months away. Six of the seven emirates agreed to form

the United Arab Emirates. In recognition of their roles in the formation of the new state, Sheikh Zayed and Sheikh Rashid were elected by their fellow rulers, respectively, as President and Vice President. The remaining emirate, Ras Al-Khaimah, joined to the new state a few weeks after independence.

Since 1971, the country has been an active member of international organizations like the United Nations and specialized coalitions--the League of Arab States, the Non-Aligned Movement and the Organization of the Islamic Conference. The Arab Gulf Cooperation Council, whose six members are the Emirates, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar and Oman, was founded at a summit conference in Abu-Dhabi, Secretariat General, in May 1981.<sup>1</sup>

#### Gulf Cooperation Council

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was conceived by the leaders of the region a number of years ago. The first summit conference was held in Abu Dhabi, the capital of the U.A.E. from 25th to 27th May, 1980; the second in Saudi Arabia, 10th and 11th November 1981; the third in Manama, Bahrain the 9th-11th of November 1982; the fourth in Doha, Qatar the 7th-9th of November 1983; the fifth in Kuwait from 27th-29th November 1984, and the sixth in Oman in November 1985.

Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf are as follows:

The United Arab Emirates

The State of Bahrain

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

The Sultanate of Oman

The State of Qatar and the State of Kuwait

All the parties were fully aware of the ties of relations, common characteristics and similar systems founded on the Creed of Islam which bind them, and believed in the common destiny and the unity of aim which link their peoples. Because of this, they desired to effect coordination, integration, and interconnection between them in all fields. They had the conviction that coordination, cooperation, and integration between them served the sublime objectives of the Arab Nation. The states were in pursuit of the goal to strengthen cooperation and reinforce the links between them to complement efforts already begun in all essential areas that concern their peoples. This would realize their hopes for a better future on the path to unity of their states. It was also in conformity with the charter of the League of Arab states which calls for the realization of closer relations and stronger bonds between Arab nations. Also this would channel their efforts to reinforce and serve Arab and Islamic causes. Consisting of a preamble and 22 articles, the charter explains in great detail the infrastructure and comprehensive goals of the Council. Four basic objectives for the GCC are outlined in Article IV of the Charter:

- To coordinate, integrate and establish close ties between the member nations in all fields.

- To deepen and consolidate the ties, links and bonds of cooperation which already exist in the region.
- To establish similar systems in various fields including finance, economics, commerce, education, culture, health, social affairs, information, tourism, legal and administrative affairs.
- To encourage scientific and technological progress in mining, industry, agriculture, scientific research.

Although the GCC is not exclusively an economic association, it is perhaps the most promising effort in economic cooperation among developing countries in recent history. In fact, the GCC has been successful in establishing a number of agreements in the fields of finance, foreign affairs, education and energy. The contacts that the GCC countries have had with the rest of the world have increased enormously in the recent years, and their economic relationships with the other countries have become much stronger and more prominent. The root cause, of course, has been the vast increase in their wealth and in their strategic importance, as the world has become increasingly dependent on them for critical energy supplies.<sup>2</sup>

#### The Economy of the GCC

The GCC region represents one of the main sources of crude oil exports for the rest of the world. Its vast natural gas reserves have scarcely been exploited to date, but offer great potential for the future. A major advantage of the region is that its geology makes the processes of extracting oil and gas

relatively cheap. The low cost of transportation gives the oil industry a further natural advantage and is not one that is shared with gas. In addition to oil and gas as sources of cheap energy for industrial and household consumption, the region has a vast potential for the future harnessing of solar energy, owing to its climatic characteristics. If energy resources provide the potential for industrialization, the lack of fresh water resources represents one of the significant factors impeding the realization of that potential. Some production processes are more water intensive than others, but in general, both industrialization and agricultural expansion imply a rising level of water utilization, and the scarcity of cheap water may become an increasing severe constraint on future economic development.

Estimates for the region as a whole indicate a surplus of water supply over demand for the next few years, but the aggregate masks the existence of scarcities in many parts of the region. The largest amount of total supply is in certain areas.

The metallogenesis of the GCC region is associated mainly with crystalline basement outcrops. By far, the largest share of known deposits of metallic minerals are located in the United Arab Emirates although there are deposits also in Oman.

#### The Political Systems

In the GCC framework, the political systems of Arab Gulf states are indeed similar. First, the newly emergent governmental structures of the six Arab Gulf states have evolved from the Arab tribalism that has existed in the region for

centuries despite persistent foreign occupation and exploitation. Second, although these states have gained independence only recently, owing to a history of foreign occupation and influence, they represent in general, a continuum of previous and long-established governing systems. Third, these systems are all vertically based on traditional authoritarian structures led by ruling families. They are influenced heavily; first by Islamic principles and practices; and then by other deeply held social beliefs and codes. Fourth, the ruling systems continue to rely on time tested methods of indirect public participation such as the majles, though in the last 20 years efforts to involve other segments of the populations directly into these government spheres have been undertaken. Fifth, they have shown a considerable ability to adapt to changing political and economic circumstances. Finally, these governments share a number of perceptions regarding foreign policy issues including an ideological opposition to communism, adherence to free market principles and practices, and a desire to remove the region from foreign influences and conflict.<sup>3</sup>

#### GCC Military

There are no programs for GCC military development. In the face of severe regional instability, the GCC member states have run the gamut of joint military exercises and established a joint rapid deployment force (RDF). The GCC established its joint military to quickly react to any potential emergency or threat to any GCC state. They have also completed the admittedly delicate

and arduous process of reaching an internal security agreement. It is also clear though, that certain areas of cooperation require a surrender of national prerogatives, national force planning, and development. The military of the GCC is not powerful and is still in the formative stage, but it has vitality. The GCC relies on a very advanced and effective military, massive joint exercises, standardization of military equipment, unified command and training, and increasing the technical knowledge of military personnel. The people and the government of the Gulf have a strong faith in the future of their military power and cooperation.<sup>4</sup>

#### The Future of the GCC

The relations between the U.S. and the GCC countries are at their warmest ever. The willingness to recognize our common interests in a stable Middle East and Gulf region, and the actions to secure a reasonable world oil market, have greatly contributed to these enhanced relations. Similarly, the cooperation in security affairs, whether it is in training and joint exercises, or in providing needed equipment and technology, have also been important components in shaping the opportunities which exist in this decade. The GCC needs the support of its friends in the United States. Just as the Marshall Plan transformed Europe and Japan after World War II, the United States has a key role to play in assuring the stability and security of the region. However, it is not enough to construct a series of bilateral strategic agreements which define our ties

solely in terms of defense agreements. What is required is an acknowledgement by both parties of the need for long-term relationships in virtually all spheres of human activity. We learn best by interacting and choosing what supports our cultural and social patterns of acceptable behavior. We should avoid feeding extremism, ethnocentrism or racism in either society.

The GCC will be effective in promoting regional peace and cooperation by maintaining its international message of the value of moderation and understanding to continue to participate positively in the world economy. On the strategic level, the Middle East has changed dramatically. The enormous changes in global relationships, the Gulf crisis, the initiation of an achievable Middle East peace process, and the recognition of the critical importance of the resources of the Arab Gulf to world stability, have contributed to a redefinition of the strategic equation in the region. The Gulf states are now seen as having an important strategic role in that part of the world. The GCC is an outstanding example of regional cooperation. Since it was formed in May 1981, the GCC has developed and deepened political, economic, and military cooperation among its six member states. The GCC has served as an important source of stability and security in a troubled area of the world.

In early August 1990, following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Ministerial Council issued a statement describing the invasion as a violation of sovereignty, demanding the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait. The ministers of defense of the GCC

met towards the end of August and put on alert, the Peninsula Shield force, to counter any attempted invasion of Saudi Arabia by Iraqi. This force subsequently formed part of the U.S. led anti-Iraq coalition. At the end of August, the Secretary General of the GCC, Abdullah Bishara, expressed the opinion that military action must be considered an option in order to expel Iraq from Kuwait. This position was reinforced at the GCC Supreme Council meeting, held in Qatar in December, when the participants issued a communique demanding that Iraq should withdraw completely from Kuwait or be faced with the prospect of war.

#### **WHY THE INVASION OCCURRED**

##### Historical Background

The reasons for the invasion dated back to the creation of present-day Kuwait. In 1899 Great Britain and Kuwait signed a treaty in which Britain assumed control of Kuwait's foreign affairs. This was done in order to thwart German imperialist designs in the region, and after World War I began, London established a protectorate over Kuwait. World War I led to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the creation by the European powers of Iraq and a number of other countries in the Middle East. These events and decisions were reflections of the European balance of power. They did not consider the region's culture or politics, and the decisions still reverberate because the finding of oil.

In 1961 the Iraqi Prime Minister, Abd Al-Kareem Qassim, announced at a press conference that Kuwait was an inseparable

part of Iraq and that the Iraqi government decided not to honor the 1899 agreement signed by Kuwait and Britain because this agreement was illegal. It declared it was ready to protect the Iraqi people in Kuwait. At the time, the Prime Minister provided all participating diplomats with documents proving that Kuwait was an Iraqi territory, and then he announced the incorporation of the Kuwaiti army into the Iraqi troops stationed in Basra. He added that the former Kuwaiti Sheikh received fifteen thousand rupees from the British envoy in "Al-Muhammara" for signing the agreement with Britain in 1899. He then proceeded to talk about the agreement and read some of its clauses in order to explain what the colonists had in mind for Iraq. The colonial power, he said, gave the agreement legitimacy, but in reality, Sheikh Jaber's brothers and friends opposed it at the time on the ground that the Sheikh was the representative of the governor of Basra, and did not have the right to enter into an agreement without consulting his superiors.<sup>5</sup>

During the same press conference held on June 26th, 1961, the Iraqi government distributed a memorandum to the Arabic and foreign ambassadors stationed in Baghdad stating the following:

Kuwait is undoubtedly a part of Iraq and colonial powers will not be able to conceal this historical truth. For a long time and especially during the Ottoman rule and up to the beginning of World War I, Kuwait was a part of Basra. Most great powers, including Britain, recognized the sovereignty of the Ottoman government over Kuwait. The ruler of Kuwait was appointed by an Ottoman decree and was considered a representative of the governor of Basra in Kuwait. Consequently, all Kuwaiti rulers derived their

administrative authority and reported to the Ottomans in Basra until 1914.

Since the 14th Century, the British colonial power attempted, in different ways and for military and economical purposes, to infiltrate the Arab world in order to occupy coastal regions on their route to India. Kuwait was one of these strategic regions and that explains why Britain attempted to occupy it and gradually separated it from Iraq. One of those steps taken to separate Kuwait from Iraq was the secret agreement signed by the British envoy in the Gulf and Sheikh Mubarak of Kuwait, on January 23, 1899. This agreement compelled the Sheikh and his descendants to concede rights they did not have, such as receiving dignitaries or disposing of Kuwait territories without prior British approval.

Despite this agreement, the ruler of Kuwait maintained his loyalty to the Ottoman sultan and his subordination to the governor of Basra.

To strengthen their influence in the area and to separate Kuwait from Iraq, the British attempted in 1913 to conclude an agreement with the Ottomans giving Kuwait a degree of self-rule. However, this attempt failed and the British resorted to force. World War I gave Britain the opportunity to occupy Iraq and consequently make Kuwait a separate entity. After the July 14th revolution in 1958, Iraq liberated herself from foreign control and began helping other countries, especially in the Arab world, to also liberate themselves. Later, the colonial powers resorted to a new form of colonialism disguised under the name of independence; Kuwait was separated from Iraq and given independent status. On June 19, 1961, Britain signed an agreement with the ruler of Kuwait ending the 1899 agreement and placing Kuwait under British protection. According to this new agreement, Britain committed itself to providing any assistance that the Kuwaiti rulers might request. The agreement also includes a clause referring to the need for consultations and at least a three-year notice in case of termination of

the agreement. The government of Iraq presented these facts to the public to show that Kuwait is an inseparable part of Iraq and to confirm its determination to resist colonialism. The government stressed its belief in the unity of the people of Iraq and Kuwait and the ultimate elimination of colonialism from Kuwait and the rest of the Arab world.

Later, in the 1970s, the increasing demands for oil aggravated trouble, at times tribal. Kuwait was an artificial creation imposed by the West, and it both denied Iraq a considerable amount of oil and restricted its access to the sea. This arrangement was never accepted, and when Kuwait received its independence on June 19, 1961, Baghdad almost immediately claimed it, basing this on the facts that Kuwait had been a part of the Ottoman Empire, that it was an artificial British creation, and it threatened Iraq's access to the sea. Threatened by invasion, Kuwait appealed to the British, whose military reaction in July 1961 was enough to thwart Iraq. Kuwait was admitted to the United Nations and the Arab League, but Iraq did not renounce its claim and would often resurrect it, and cite it to justify the August invasion.<sup>6</sup>

#### **THE IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT**

##### **The Immediate Events Leading To The Invasion**

Prior to the invasion, Iraq publicly threatened Kuwait and accused Kuwaiti officials of exceeding production quotas set by OPEC, thereby driving down the price of oil. Iraqi officials claimed that they were losing one billion dollars annually as a

result of the action taken by Kuwait and other OPEC members pertaining to production quotas.

Another issue of disagreement was the dispute over the Rumaylah oil field. The Iraqi government claimed that Kuwait illegally gained about \$2.4 billion by selling oil pumped secretly from the Iraqi side of the field while Baghdad was busy with the war against Iraq. Iraq also demanded that Kuwait forgive all loans that the Iraqi government had taken during the Iraq-Iran War. In addition, Iraq demanded that Bubian Island be leased to Iraq.

Faced with an economic crisis of a huge national debt of about \$70 billion and the need to execute essential government projects, the Iraqi government assumed that by invading Kuwait and seizing its oil and investment revenues, its economic problems would be solved. In addition, Iraq would be able to control the large and important Ahmadi port, and would be sitting on 20 percent of all the world's known oil reserves. Thus, there were numerous reasons for Iraq's decision to invade Kuwait 23 months later. Iraq could not repay about \$80 billion that had been borrowed to finance the Iran-Iraq War. It could argue that the war was in Kuwaiti and Saudi interests since the enemy was Iranian messianic Shiite fundamentalism, which potentially threatened them. Kuwait's decision to not forgive Iraq's \$65 billion debt then provided economic and emotional justification for the Iraqi invasion. Second, the Kuwaitis were incredibly rich and had huge investments abroad. Access to this wealth

could resolve Iraq's financial problems. The third reason was alleged Kuwaiti oil drilling in the Rumaylah oil field, which lay in disputed border territory, and the fourth was Kuwaiti over-production of oil. Gulf revenues were depressed as a result of an oil glut on the spot market in the late 1980s; and on July 17, 1990, Saddam threatened to use force as retribution for Kuwaiti over-production and underpricing.

The talks between the Kuwaiti crown prince, Sheikh Saad Abd-Allah, and the deputy to the president of Iraqi Revolutionary Council, Mr. Ezzat Ibrahim, collapsed. This was due to the Kuwaiti rejection of Iraqi demands as stated in a speech delivered by Saddam Hussein on the anniversary of the July 17th revolution and reiterated in a memorandum by Tariq Aziz, the Iraqi Foreign Minister to the Arab League. In those two documents, Iraq directly accused Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates of violating oil production quotas, set by OPEC, in order to flood the market and drive down the price of oil. In his speech, Saddam indicated that Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, and the United States were plotting to destroy Iraq economically.<sup>7</sup>

On July 25, 1990, President Saddam Hussein summoned the U.S. Ambassador April Glaspie to his office in the last high level contact between the two governments before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2.

## The Invasion

At about 2:00 a.m. (Baghdad time), on August 2, 1990, three Iraqi Republican Guard divisions invaded Kuwait. One proceeded down a coastal road to Kuwait City, a second seized the inland oil fields, and the third proceeded to the Saudi Arabian border. Kuwaiti A-4 aircraft and Chieftain tanks fought for three days until their fuel and ammunition were exhausted. The small Kuwaiti Navy also made a valiant showing, with the last two fast attack crafts escaping while firing at Iraqi tanks.

### Military Comparison of Iraqi and Kuwaiti forces:

	Ships	Fighters	Tanks	Forces
Iraq	51	513	5,500	1,000,000
Kuwait	46	36	275	20,300

Iraqi forces quickly captured Kuwait City and the Emir's palace, while the Kuwaiti ruler, Sheik Jaber Al-Ahmed al-Sabah, fled to Saudi Arabia and established a government in exile. On August 3rd, the remainder of Kuwait was captured and by the 4th, Iraqi forces were amassed along the Kuwaiti-Saudi border for a possible invasion. If Iraq occupied Saudi Arabia, it would not only establish itself as the secular leader of the Arab world, but also would control 45% of the world's oil.<sup>1</sup>

**IRAQI DIVISION TABLES OF EQUIPMENT**

Force	Type of Div	No. Div	Person	AR	ARTTY	AFV s	ADA* Guns	ADA SAM s
REG ARM	Mech	2	12,179	175	114	544	90	50
	Armored	7	12,129	245	114	472	90	50
	Inf	23	14,131	35	78	6	54	0
REP GDS	Mech	2	13,754	220	138	622	90	50
	Armored	2	13,734	308	144	538	90	50
	Inf	6	14,261	44	18	6	54	0

NOTE: The figures given are estimates of Iraqi forces deployed in the Kuwait Theater of Operations.

On August 2, 1990, the Soviet Union voted with the United States in the U.N. Security Council to condemn Iraqi aggression and to demand their immediate withdrawal from Kuwait. That vote set the stage for all that followed.

**INTERNATIONAL REACTIONS**

The Arab World

The Arab countries need not fight each other or dominate each other. On the contrary, they should cooperate between each other and defend each other in order to eliminate anxiety or fear from a region where people are meant to coexist peacefully. Both

Arabs and Westerns believe that the Gulf will soon regain its peace and harmony.

Contrary to some rumors, not one Kuwaiti minister has been injured or imprisoned; all Kuwaiti ministers have left the country to a nearby location where they have been meeting and consulting with each other. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sheikh Sabah, Minister of Defense, Sheikh Nawaf, and Minister of Interior, Sheikh Salim are all well. However, Kuwait and sports circle in the Arab world have lost Sheikh Fahd Al-Ahmed who was killed while defending Kuwait. Efforts are underway to contain the conflict, keep it regional, and prevent it from becoming an international issue. The meeting which was supposed to be held in Jidda, at the invitation of King Fahd, was postponed. President Mubarak, Ali Abdallah Saleh, King Hussein, Sheikh Zayed Bin Sultan Al-Nahyan, Sheikh Jaber, and perhaps Saddam Hussein were all supposed to attend. President Husni Mubarak stated that the meeting, which was postponed for formality reasons, will be held soon. On the other hand, the holding of a large summit, called for by President Hafez Assad, is becoming popular. However, some Arab leaders prefer to have smaller summit in order to facilitate the agenda of a large summit. At the smaller summit, for example, the Arab leaders can deal with the issue of the new Kuwaiti government that does not include any Kuwaitis. They also can deal with the army of two hundred thousand soldiers which were sent to protect the newly installed Kuwaiti government.<sup>9</sup>

In several international capitals, Kuwaiti citizens have been demonstrating and asking for the return of the Kuwaiti Emir, Sheikh Jaber Al-Ahmed Al-Sabbah, and Sheikh Saad and his government.

In order to defuse the crisis, Qaddafi and Arafat submitted a plan containing the following points:

- Renting Bubian island to Iraq.
- Canceling Iraqi debts.
- Partial payment of Iraqi international debts.
- Forming a new government.
- Reaching a settlement for the Rumailah well dispute.

On the other hand, Israel is attempting to obtain U.S. assistance and permission in order to attack Iraq and destroy her military forces.

When the Iraqi army entered Kuwait, 1300 prisoners fled. Among the freed political prisoners were those who were sentenced for subversion activities and were supposed to be exchanged for American hostages in Lebanon.

#### Helsinki Declaration

Concerning the Iraqi invasion and the continuation of military occupation of Kuwait, both President Bush and President Gorbachev stated that they refused to allow the Iraqi invasion to succeed because it is impossible to create a new peaceful world order if large countries are allowed to dominate small neighboring countries. They added that they supported the joint statement issued by their foreign ministers on August 3, 1990,

and United Nations Security Council resolutions numbers 660, 661, 662, 664, and 665. They renewed their call for the Iraqi government to withdraw unconditionally and allow the legitimate Kuwaiti government to return to power. They also called for the release of all foreign hostages detained presently in Iraq and Kuwait.

They stated that nothing short of full implementations of all United Nations' resolutions will be accepted, and the Iraqi isolation will not end until the situation in Kuwait returned to pre-August state. They further called upon all countries of the world to work individually and collectively to insure full Iraqi compliance with the United Nations sanctions. The United States and the Soviet Union, they said, recognize that the United Nations Security Council Resolution 661 allows, for humanitarian reason, Iraq and Kuwait to import food. The committee, which oversees the implementation of the sanctions, will provide the Security Council with a list of situations in which goods can be imported for humanitarian reasons. At the same time, the committee will make sure that the food will not get into the wrong hands. For example, feeding children is a priority.

The two presidents further stated that they preferred to solve this crisis peacefully. However, if peaceful attempts fail, they were ready to take all necessary steps stipulated in the United Nations Charter in order to eliminate Iraqi aggression.<sup>10</sup>

The two presidents promised to instruct their foreign ministers to work with countries in the region and outside the region towards creating a security organization whose aim is to further peace and stability.

Finally, the two presidents stated that they will consult with each other and work together in order to solve all remaining conflicts in the Middle East and the Gulf region. Soviet hard liners expressed concern.

#### MOSCOW: DOVES & HAWKS

Diplomats and military experts have been wondering whether war will take place in the Gulf. Speculations have been confused with facts. Since the first week of the invasion, the United States has forestalled the United Nations Security Council resolutions in order to draw the Council close to its position. It is significant to know that the U.S. is using diplomatic channels as a cover for its military intentions. Washington is also trying to win over the Soviet capital at a time when the Soviets are promoting the issue of human rights. Washington has been exploiting the Soviet position in order to mount the largest military campaign since World War II.

On the other hand, the Soviets have been surprised by the advanced weapons the U.S. has been transporting to the Middle East, including nuclear powered airplane carrier Eisenhower. As a result, a new conservative stream has developed in Moscow.

Due to the American military buildup in the Gulf, the top Soviet military generals are concerned about the safety of their southern borders because Iraq is only 200 miles away from the borders of Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Soviet generals have stated that, at a time when the two countries are conducting disarmament negotiations, the U.S. is moving her arsenals from Western Europe to the Middle East. General Lopove, for example, considers the western military

presence in the Gulf will undoubtedly affect the disarmament negotiations in Vienna. However, a spokesman for foreign affairs ministry stated that the negotiations in Vienna are plagued by reasons not related to American military buildup in the Gulf. Sources indicated that Gorbachev's "perestroyka" has not reached the military and the top Soviet military officers believe that Washington is exploiting the new openness in the Kremlin at the time when the Soviet Union is experiencing a military decline.

The official newspaper "ISZVESTIA" has reported that the Soviet Foreign Affairs Ministry has issued a statement assuring the military that the American buildup in the Gulf does not threaten the Soviet southern borders and conceding the presence of hundreds of Soviet military experts in Iraq. However, these experts are not participating in any front line operations, the statement added.

Before the arrival of President Bush to Helsinki to attend a conference dealing with the Middle East crisis, both Gorbachev and his foreign minister made statements in which they opposed any military operations in the Middle East. These statements, which seem to slow down Bush's military campaign, reflect the tough position adopted by the military.<sup>11</sup>

"The first time since World War II." That phrase was the signal for the decision to begin the Persian Gulf War. The reason, as President Bush said, was that for the first time since World War II, the international community was united. More specifically, for the first time since that war the United States and the USSR were united in a common cause. That alliance made all the difference in the world. In a real sense, the war was decided on the very day it began.

## Iraq Besieged By The World

The joint American-Soviet statement regarding the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was the first post-cold war test of the ability of the two superpowers to bring genuine peace to the Middle East.

All efforts made by Washington and Moscow in the past did not achieve peace; for these efforts mainly aimed at containing the war in the Middle East and preventing it from becoming an international conflict. The day after the invasion, in an unprecedented move, the United States and the Soviet Union issued a statement calling for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait and the preservation of Kuwaiti sovereignty, independence, and legitimate authority. In addition, Washington stressed again the need for Iraq to withdraw immediately and unconditionally from Kuwait and asked the United Nations Security Council to impose on Iraq economic sanctions and military embargo.

As a result of the changes in Europe, some western and Arab analysts believe that the Middle East is no longer a region where the two superpowers have to compete. The U.S.-Soviet statement urged the world community to halt any sales of weapons to Iraq. However, a Soviet spokesman ruled out any joint American-Soviet military action. TASS News Agency reported that, in a telephone conversation, President Gorbachev and President Mitterand discussed the Gulf War and described the situation in the region

as dangerous, stressing the need to solve the crisis by allowing the Kuwaiti Emir to return to Kuwait as the legitimate ruler.<sup>12</sup>

#### World Economic Embargo

The twelve members of the European Common Market issued a communique in which they stated the following: "The member countries, once again, affirmed their belief that any conflict between countries should be resolved peacefully. The European community and the individual members of the Common Market are ready to participate in any effort aimed at lessening contentions in the Middle East. The members are in constant contact with the respective governments in the region and follow closely the discussions that are underway in the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council. The members of the European Common Market hope that the Arab initiative will succeed in returning the legitimate government to Kuwait and they promise to provide full support to the initiatives and efforts that are exerted in order to solve the conflict between the two countries. The government of the members of the European Common Market follow with concern the situation of their citizens presently residing in Iraq and Kuwait. They are coordinating among themselves to insure their safety. They reiterate their condemnations of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and call for immediate and unconditional Iraqi withdrawal.

In the communique, the members also rejected the Iraqi justification for the invasion. They promised to refrain from any action that might be interpreted as an indirect recognition

of the new status in Kuwait. Members of the European Common Market have taken all measures to protect all assets belonging to the Kuwaiti government. All member countries affirmed their support to the United Nations Resolution 660 and called on Iraq to respect the provisions of the resolution. In addition, they took several measures against Iraq such as the immediate halt of Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil imports, the freeze of Iraqi assets found in the member countries, the halting of weapons and military equipment sales to Iraq, the suspension of military cooperation, the suspension of scientific and technical cooperation, and the suspension of Iraq's most favored nation status.<sup>13</sup>

It has been learned that the embargo on Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil imports has begun. Sources in the oil industry have indicated that the reason for the embargo is to show solidarity with the United States and to apply pressure that might create an environment for reconciliation. The European decision to halt the Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil imports will undoubtedly disrupt the oil supplies and will drastically raise the price of oil despite the fact that European oil reserves are high and may meet Europe's need of oil for over 100 days. Sources indicated that Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil imports represent 16% of the oil consumed by the European countries. Oil prices in Europe have increased by one third; and if the Gulf crisis is not solved soon, oil producing countries may find themselves forced to increase their oil production.

It is significant to note that 90% of all Iraqi foreign currencies derive from the export of crude oil with total 2.7 million barrels a day. According to statistics gathered by the British Petroleum Company, the United States imported 1.7 million barrels of Iraqi oil in the first three months of 1990, while Europe imported 850,000 barrels from Iraq and 300,000 barrels from Kuwait. Iraq also exports oil to Eastern Europe and several Third World countries.

Concern over the decreased in oil supplies has pushed up the price per barrel to \$21 in the spot market, price of barrel has already increased by one third last month and may reach \$30-\$40 when the embargo on Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil imports takes effect. Should the crisis continue, NON-OPEC countries such as Venezuela and Nigeria may be pressured to compensate for the shortage of oil supplies.<sup>14</sup>

#### Japanese Position

In a meeting with George Bush, the President of the United States, the Japanese Prime Minister asserted Japan's willingness to impose economic sanction on Iraq as stipulated in the United Nation's resolutions.

Sources indicated that 44 Japanese citizens took refuge at the Japanese embassy in Kuwait immediately after the Iraqi soldiers came to their building asking for water. However, the officials of the embassy did not see the need to evacuate the 392 Japanese citizens residing presently in Kuwait. The Prime Minister also indicated that Japan will support all measures

taken by western countries and the United Nations, and that all Kuwaiti assets in Iraq have been frozen.

#### Shock In Financial Institutions

The American administration was still dealing with the 1988 financial crisis when the saving and loans financial institutions failed and some large American banks became paralyzed as a consequence. Due to high inflation and unemployment, several experts predict more financial failures, a fact that will cause the American Congress to levy new taxes.

Due to an increase in oil price and a decrease in the value of the dollar, stocks in the markets of Tokyo, London, Paris, Hong Kong, and New York fell sharply at a time when many western countries were preparing to invest heavily in Eastern Europe. It was clear that the Iraqi aggression has wreaked havoc in the international economic system; and the United States, along with several other countries, have mounted a campaign against Iraq in an attempt to bring order back into that system.

Some industrial countries had second thoughts about economic sanction against Iraq. Japan, which imports 99% of her oil, considers herself a victim of the American policy. As a result of the collapse of its stock market, Holland is trying to exclude Kuwaiti oil companies from the sanctions. Italian companies have lost all the oil money they have made since 1990. The economic crisis is serious. Washington and the west are trying to remedy the situation by deploying war ships in the Gulf and the Middle

East. If the Gulf crisis is not resolved soon, however, these ships will not be helpful.

President Bush went on the offensive. At every opportunity, he explained America's political objectives in the Persian Gulf. Writing in the November 26, 1990, Newsweek, he reiterated them:

Our goals have not changed since I first outlined them to the American people last August. First, the immediate and unconditional withdraw of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Second, the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government. Third, security and stability for the Gulf, an important national interest of the United States since the time of Harry Truman; and fourth, the protection of American citizens abroad.

#### THE 100 HOUR WAR

##### The Participation of the United Arab Emirates in the Gulf War

The United Arab Emirates provided facilities to deploy over 255 airplanes for coalition forces. The coalition planes used seven airports in the following locations: Abu Dhabi, Al-Ayn, Al-Zafrah, Al Minhad, Dubai, Al-Sharkah and Al Betayn. The rapid response of cooperation by the United Arab Emirates government was essential for coalition success in deterring further Iraqi attacks and any attempts to expand the war to neighboring countries.

Additionally, almost all parts and shipyards facilities in the U.A.E. were made available for the coalition forces. Also, the Armed Forces of the United Arab Emirates contributed to the coalition forces one army battalion along with a squadron of fighters consisting of Mirage-5 and Mirage 2000.

Before the air war began, Iraqi forces outnumbered coalition troops three to two. U.S. and coalition forces were concentrated and aligned opposite the enemy in Kuwait, reinforcing Iraq's belief that an attack would come over the Saudi-Kuwaiti frontier. An active naval presence in the Gulf presented the threat of an amphibious landing. With Iraq's ability to perform air reconnaissance wiped out by the air war, coalition forces shifted to the west unobserved, gaining the vital element of surprise. Logistics bases were created by moving thousands upon thousands of tons of supplies. U.S. Special Forces, were dropped behind enemy lines to provide friendly reconnaissance. On February 26, 1991, at 4:00 a.m., two Saudi task forces moved up the coast, penetrating Iraqi defenses. The 1st and 2nd Marine divisions punched through the border near where Iraq expected an assault to begin. The biggest surprise took place to the west. French forces and one brigade from the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division drove toward AS Salmon air field. Hours later, the 101st Airborne Division moved north to establish a forward fuel and ammunition base. Later that day, the surprise invasion in the west continued as the U.S. VII Corps, which included the 1st British Armored Division, mounted a massive assault into Iraq. The 24th Mechanized Infantry Division also broke over the western border and the 101st Airborne continued pressing north to the Tigris-Euphrates Valley. That afternoon an Egyptian-led Arab force, and a second Saudi force broke across the Kuwaiti border farther to the east. Saudi troops continued driving up the Kuwaiti Coast.

Off the coast, U.S. Special Forces pursued mine-clearing operation, keeping alive the threat of an amphibious landing. British forces drove east, as did additional Arab forces, and the VII Corps. The 24th Division thrust to the Euphrates River and blocked east-west roads, cutting off Iraqi forces. French troops set up a defensive line in the west. In a matter of 100 hours the coalition forces were victorious and the war over.

The world was astonished by the speed and effectiveness of the coalition forces in conducting the Gulf War. But we should not take for granted that similar situations in the future are going to be dealt with in a similar fashion. However, aggressors in the Middle East may think twice before contemplating an adventure similar to Saddam's. Friends and allies should be prepared fully and adequately to deter and repel any attack without delay and without the need to wait six months, as was the case in the Gulf War, to assemble the necessary forces.

#### Military Talks In Safwan, IRAQ

Pursuant to the decision made by the United States and its allies to cease military operations on February 28, 1991, the Iraqis agreed to attend a meeting to discuss the cessation of military operations, to sign an official cease-fire, to exchange prisoners of war, and to provide detailed information on soldiers missing in action.

On March 3rd, a 90-minute meeting took place at Safwan, in southern Iraq. This location was selected by CENTCOM for its proximity to the Kuwaiti border and an Iraqi airport.

General Norman Schwarzkopf represented the coalition, and he was accompanied by the highest ranking commanders of the various allied forces. General Ahmed Al-Jabouri, Deputy Chief-Of-Staff, represented Iraq and was accompanied by ten high ranking military officers including the commander of Iraqi 3rd corps, Major General Al-Daghastani. Following the initial conversations, General Schwarzkopf proposed that Iraq agreed to all the conditions that were declared by the American President. Then General Schwarzkopf asked the Iraqis to provide detailed information regarding American and coalition POWs, and the Iraqis agreed to provide that information. When informed that the Iraqi POWs were still being counted and that the latest count reached 60,000 soldiers, the Iraqi officers were greatly surprised. When General Schwarzkopf drew the demarcation line on the map, the Iraqis wondered why the line should be located behind their troops. Again, the Iraqi officers were surprised to learn that their troops had already been pushed north of the line. Pursuant to these two incidents, the Iraqis ceased to be hostile and began to cooperate with General Schwarzkopf and the coalition commanders.

#### **ALLIES VICTORIOUS**

On June 8, 1991, the United States held a victory day parade in Washington, DC and a similar, although smaller, parade was held in London on June 21, 1991. The troops were welcomed home and commended for their deeds, as both nations looked to the

future. However, many are still attempting to gauge the war's significance.

The war's significance to international relations is that it is the first violent manifestation in the post-Cold War era. Its relevance is in the fact that it occurred at all. From 1946 until 1989, the world was bipolarized and peace was maintained through an overriding Soviet-American rivalry. Harrowing and nerve-racking at times, it nonetheless was a peace; its several wars were contained with limited violence for fear that escalation would drive the world into Armageddon.

The allies fought with largely volunteer forces. America's all-volunteer force did not happen by default. It was carefully built and preserved out of the hollow force that had been allowed to develop in the 1970s. The U.S. Congress was also important in providing the democratic leadership support of the force in the field.

The Middle East will continue to command attention for the future. The coalition partners in the Gulf have become the critical element of the military balance in the region and cannot now back out of that position without affecting that balance negatively. We will have to maintain the capability to bring military forces to bear in the region for the foreseeable future to protect our interests.<sup>15</sup>

#### **LESSONS LEARNED**

What was this war, and what lessons does it provide? It helps to begin by putting it in perspective. In comparison to

history's earlier conflicts, the war was rather small in that it lasted only weeks instead of months or years, hardly time to spawn an F. Scott Fitzgerald, Ernest Hemingway, or even a Leon Uris. Artistically, no Guernicas are in sight, and musically, "Voices that Care" and "I'm Proud to Be an American" are hardly comparable to the 1812 overture. No, the war's contribution lies elsewhere. Its significance is in its profound political, economic, scientific, technical, and military impact, which makes it of the greatest importance to us all. If we can fathom its significance and the lessons it offers, then we can learn and profit from the experience.

For the Gulf Cooperation Council generally and especially for the United Arab Emirates and the United States, cooperation should be continued. Drawing on their experience in Desert Storm, they should attempt to expand training programs. We, in the United Arab Emirates and other members of G.C.C., should maximize our benefits from the new advanced equipments that are able to locate and hit mobil targets. We should also stress the need to be fully prepared to deal with terrorist organizations because of the wide range and advanced weapons they are capable of using.

The lesson of the coalition experience was that America benefitted because in its leadership role it showed great consideration for foreign sensitivities. Bush's personal approach was very successful, and America emerged from the war with greater prestige which could be valuable as it works for a

New World Order. Whether this could be sustained in the postwar period is problematic, but at war's end, guarded optimism was warranted. Finally, the White House regained control of U.S. foreign policy, and this might figure prominently in future U.S. commitments overseas.

The Gulf War showed that oil has lost its effect as political leverage factor. As there are new oil sources such as the Soviet Union provinces, the world is turning toward new alternative sources.

The Gulf War showed that the purchasing of advanced technology does not make advanced societies. Also, the Gulf War proved that economical sanctions had and continues to have no effect in removing Saddam Hussein.<sup>16</sup>

#### CONCLUSIONS

The Middle East will continue to command the attention of the world for the future. We have become the critical element of the military balance in the region, and we cannot now back out of that position without affecting that balance negatively. We will have to maintain the capability to bring military forces to bear in the region for the foreseeable future to protect the interests.

These interests translate into a number of strategic, diplomatic and military objectives:

- Promote the establishment of democratic governments.
- Encourage peaceful resolution of regional conflicts.

- Discourage proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.
- Encourage economic growth.
- Prevent single actor from gaining control of oil.
- Prevent the formation of an oil cartel.
- Prevent a hostile regional actor from controlling key waterways.

The military balance in the Middle East is not a balance at all, at least not in the sense of a stable equilibrium. The current military situation is instead a very unstable solution that can be precipitated into a violent reaction with any number of catalysts.

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Mohammed Mahmood The Ministry of Information, "United Arab Emirates," 1971-1986 Fifteen Years of Progress, Abu-Dhabi, pp.15-19.

<sup>2</sup>R.K. Ramazani, "The Gulf Cooperation Council Record and Analysis, p. 13.

<sup>3</sup>Mahmood Mohammed, "Special Report Regarding the Resources Base for Industrialization in the Member States of the Gulf," 1985, p. 159.

<sup>4</sup>Emile A. Nakhieh, "The Gulf Cooperation Council Policies, Problems and Prospects,"pp. 57, 90, 100.

<sup>5</sup>Nabil Majdy, Al-Sbooh Al-Araby Newspaper, 8/10/90,p.10.

<sup>6</sup>Fauid Mansoor, Oktober Newspaper, 8/11/90, p. 36.

<sup>7</sup>Erik R. Peterson, "The Gulf Cooperation Council, Middle East Policy, " Volume 1, 1992, p. 16.

<sup>8</sup>Watson Bruce, George Bruce, Peter Tsouras, and B. L.Cyr, "Military Lessons of the Gulf War," pp. 15, 16, 21-29, 213-214.

<sup>9</sup>Reporter, "Events Leading to the Crisis, "At-Tadamon Newspaper, published in London, 8/12/90,N, 383, p. 13.

<sup>10</sup>Fauid Mansoor, Al-Majlah Newspaper, 8/14/90, p.8.

<sup>11</sup>Adallah Dabbagh, "GCC US Relations", p.20.

<sup>12</sup>Fauad Abu-Mansoor, "Historical Background, " Al-Sbooh Al- Araby Newspaper, 8/13/90, p. 6.

<sup>13</sup>Col. Harry Summers Jr., "A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War, pp. 231-232.

<sup>14</sup>Nabil Majdy, "Back to History, " Al-Tadamon Newspaper, published in London, NB 83, 8/13/90, p. 15.

<sup>15</sup>Watson Bruce. op. cit. p. 50.

<sup>16</sup>Dr. Majeda Shafiq Ahmed, "How the West Sees the Future of the Middle East in view of the Regional and International New Changes," Asharq Al-Awsat Newspaper, London, Arab Press House p. 13.

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